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Abstract 
 
A significant innovation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is 
contained in section 162. This provision empowers a court to 
declare a director delinquent or under probation on various 
grounds. The effect of a delinquency order is that a person is 
disqualified from being a director of a company, while being 
placed under probation means that he or she may not serve as 
a director except to the extent permitted by the order. A 
delinquency order may be unconditional and subsist for the 
director's lifetime, or it may be conditional and be effective for 
seven years or longer, as determined by the court. A probation 
order generally subsists for a period not exceeding five years, 
and may be subject to such conditions as the court considers 
appropriate. The harsh effects of these orders are alleviated by 
section 162(11) of the Companies Act. Under this provision, a 
delinquent director may apply to court after three years have 
elapsed, to suspend the delinquency order and to substitute it 
with a probation order, with or without conditions. A person who 
was placed under a probation order may apply to court after two 
years for the probation order to be set aside. This article 
examines the procedure under section 162(11) of the 
Companies Act for the suspension and setting aside of 
delinquency and probation orders. The factors that a court must 
take into account in exercising its discretion whether or not to 
grant the application, as set out in section 162(12) of the 
Companies Act, are also examined. This article draws on 
relevant jurisprudence as decided on the equivalent provisions 
in the corporate legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
The method of interpretation used in these jurisdictions provides 
useful guidance on how best to apply and interpret sections 
162(11) and (12) of the Companies Act. Recommendations are 
made regarding the proper approach to interpreting, applying 
and enhancing sections 162(11) and (12) of the Companies Act. 
Keywords 
Company law; delinquent directors; sections 162(11) and 
162(12) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; suspension of 
delinquency orders; setting aside of probation orders; 
rehabilitation of delinquent directors; discretion of court.  
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1  Introduction 
A significant innovation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter the Act) 
is contained in section 162, which empowers a court to make an order 
declaring a director delinquent or under probation on various grounds.1 The 
innovation in section 162 lies in the introduction of a new civil remedy for 
those harmed by the conduct of delinquent directors.2 The effect of an order 
of delinquency is that a person is automatically disqualified from being a 
director of a company.3 A delinquency order may be unconditional and 
subsist for the director's lifetime or it may be conditional and subsist for 
seven years or longer, as determined by the court.4 The effect of a probation 
order is that a person may not serve as a director except to the extent 
permitted by the order.5 A probation order generally subsists for a period 
not exceeding five years,6 and may be subject to such conditions as the 
court considers appropriate.7 While the effects of delinquency and probation 
                                            
*  Rehana Cassim. BA (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM (cum laude) (Witwatersrand), 
LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of 
South Africa, attorney and notary public of the High Court of South Africa. E-mail: 
cassir@unisa.ac.za. This article is based on sections of the author's LLD thesis. 
1  A discussion of delinquency orders and probation orders in general is beyond the 
scope of this article. For a general discussion on delinquency and probation orders 
see Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ); Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 
(GSJ); Msimang v Katuliiba 2013 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) (hereafter Msimang); 
Rabinowitz v Van Graan 2013 5 SA 315 (GSJ); Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 
2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) (hereafter Grancy); Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2017 
2 SA 337 (SCA) (hereafter Gihwala); Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 2 SA 547 
(WCC) (hereafter Lewis Group); Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 565-
574; Cassim 2016 PELJ 1-28; and Du Plessis and Delport 2017 SALJ 274-295.  
2  Grancy para 155. Some examples of conduct which have resulted in delinquency 
orders are: (a) failing to refund money to the South African Revenue Service 
(Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ); (b) taking financial benefits and unlawfully 
excluding a shareholder from such benefits to which he is entitled (Gihwala); (c) 
failing to prepare annual financial statements or not holding annual general meetings 
for a number of years (Msimang); (d) allowing a company to trade knowing that it is 
insolvent (Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Cresswell 2017 
ZAWCHC 38 (27 March 2017)); and (e) soliciting and accepting directors’ 
emoluments from the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation SOC Limited to 
which the director was not entitled (Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission v Zwane 2019 ZAGPPHC 381 (8 August 2019)). 
3  Section 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act). See further Rabinowitz 
v Van Graan 2013 5 SA 315 (GSJ) para 20; Grancy para 159 and Lewis Group para 
5. 
4  Section 162(6) of the Act. 
5  Section 69(5) of the Act. 
6  Section 162(9)(b) of the Act. 
7  Section 162(10) of the Act. 
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orders are undeniably harsh, their effects are alleviated by section 162(11)8 
of the Act. 
In terms of section 162(11)(a) of the Act, a delinquent director may, at any 
time after three years since the order of delinquency was made, apply to 
court to suspend the delinquency order and to substitute it with a probation 
order, with or without conditions. A person who is subsequently placed 
under a probation order by way of the substitution of the delinquency order 
may apply to court at any time more than two years thereafter for an order 
setting aside the probation order.9 A person who was originally placed under 
a probation order may apply to court for the probation order to be set aside 
after a period of at least two years has elapsed since the probation order 
was made.10 The implication of a successful application under section 
162(11) is that, in effect, the minimum periods of a delinquency order and a 
probation order are three years and two years respectively. This article 
examines the procedure as envisaged in section 162(11) of the Act for the 
suspension and setting aside of delinquency and probation orders. The 
factors that a court must consider in exercising its discretion whether to 
grant the application, as set out in section 162(12) of the Act, are also 
examined.  
The jurisprudence on this procedure has not yet been developed by South 
African courts. Section 17 of the United Kingdom (hereafter the UK) 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 198611 (hereafter the CDDA) and 
section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act, 200112 (hereafter the 
                                            
8  Section 162(11) of the Act provides as follows: "(11) A person who has been 
declared delinquent, other than as contemplated in subsection (6)(a), or is subject 
to an order of probation, may apply to a court- (a) to suspend the order of 
delinquency, and substitute an order of probation, with or without conditions, at any 
time more than three years after the order of delinquency was made; or (b) to set 
aside an order of- (i) delinquency at any time more than two years after it was 
suspended as contemplated in paragraph (a); or (ii) of probation, at any time more 
than two years after it was made." 
9  Section 162(11)(b)(i) of the Act. 
10  Section 162(11)(b)(ii) of the Act. 
11  In accordance with s 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986 (the 
CDDA) a disqualified person may apply for leave to act as a director. A court may, 
in its discretion, waive the disqualification of a director to some extent and permit a 
disqualified director to act as a director of specific companies, with or without 
conditions, as determined by the court. The effect of a successful application under 
both this provision and s 162(11) of the Act is that a disqualified person may act as 
a director to the extent permitted by the court and subject to the conditions imposed 
by the court. For a further discussion of s 17 of the CDDA, see Davies and 
Worthington Gower: Principles of Modern Company Law 235-253. 
12  Under s 206G(1) of the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 a court may grant leave 
to a person who is disqualified from managing corporations to manage corporations 
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Australian Corporations Act) contain procedures similar to those provided 
in sections 162(11) and (12) of the Act. This article examines the relevant 
provisions of the CDDA for the reason that South African company law is 
historically based on the English company law system and the company law 
in both these jurisdictions was recently reviewed. Relevant provisions of the 
Australian Corporations Act, which is historically largely based on UK 
company law, will also be reviewed in order to ascertain whether any useful 
guidelines may be deduced which are relevant to South African law. This 
approach is reinforced by section 5(2) of the Act, which provides that, to the 
extent appropriate, a court interpreting or applying the Act may consider 
foreign law. For these reasons this article draws on relevant jurisprudence 
in the UK and Australia for useful guidance on how best to interpret and 
apply sections 162(11) and (12) of the Act. Recommendations are proffered 
regarding the proper construct to be afforded to these provisions, and how 
they should be applied. 
2  Procedure to suspend or set aside a delinquency order 
or probation order 
2.1  Application to suspend or set aside a delinquency order or 
probation order  
Section 162(11) of the Act applies to directors who have been declared 
delinquent by a court or who are subject to a probation order (hereafter the 
applicant). It does not apply to those directors who have been declared 
delinquent under sections 162(5)(a) or (b) of the Act, that is, on account of: 
(a) having consented to act as a director or having acted in the capacity of 
a director while ineligible or disqualified;13 or (b) having acted as a director 
while under a probation order in a manner that contravened that probation 
order.14 In these instances, the declaration of delinquency subsists for the 
lifetime of such a person and cannot be suspended or set aside.  
                                            
or a particular class of corporations or a particular corporation, with or without 
conditions, as determined by the court. The process under s 206G of the Australian 
Corporations Act is likewise similar to that under s 162(11) of the Act. 
13  Section 162(5)(a) of the Act states that this ground of delinquency does not apply if 
the person was acting under the protection of a court order contemplated in s 69(11) 
or as a director contemplated in s 69(12). Under s 69(11) of the Act a court may 
exempt a person from the application of the grounds of disqualification set out in  
s 69(8)(b) of the Act. The reference to s 69(12) in s 162(5)(a)(ii) is an error as s 
69(12) was deleted by s 46(c) of the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011. Refer 
to s 69 of the Act on the grounds of ineligibility and disqualification to be a director. 
14  Refer to ss 162(5)(a) and (b), 162(6)(a) and 162(11) of the Act.  
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Section 162(11) of the Act may not be invoked unless the applicant has 
served a minimum of three years of the delinquency order. With regard to a 
probation order, the provision may be invoked only after a period of two 
years has passed since the order was made. A probation order may be 
imposed for a period not exceeding five years, as determined by the court.15 
In the event that a probation order of two years or less is imposed on a 
director, the provisions of section 162(11) of the Act would not come to the 
assistance of a director. The director would have no choice but to serve the 
full period of his or her probation order.16  
Setting aside a delinquency order is a two-stage process under section 
162(11) of the Act. The applicant must first apply to have the delinquency 
order suspended and substituted with an order of probation. After a period 
of at least two further years, he or she may thereafter apply for the 
substituted probation order to be set aside.17 It is submitted that the 
mandatory two-stage approach adopted under the Act is commendable as 
it affords a court time and opportunity to monitor and assess the conduct of 
the delinquent director during the period that the order is substituted with a 
probation order. If a court is not satisfied with the conduct of the delinquent 
director during this period, it may decline to set aside the substituted 
probation order. Monitoring the delinquent director's conduct during the 
suspension of the delinquent order is critical in the light of the fact that a 
delinquency order is aimed at protecting companies and corporate 
stakeholders against directors who have proven themselves unable to 
manage the company's business or who have neglected their duties and 
obligations as company directors.18 It is submitted that a two-stage process 
to have a delinquency order set aside facilitates this object. 
It is notable that section 17(5) of the CDDA imposes a duty on the Secretary 
of State to appear on an application of a person for leave to act as a director, 
                                            
15  Section 162(9)(b) of the Act. 
16  In contrast, the CDDA does not specify any time period after which an applicant may 
apply for leave to act as a director. In fact, under s 17 of the CDDA a person who 
faces the possibility of a disqualification order is encouraged to immediately seek 
leave to act as a director (see further Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 1010 (hereafter Collins & Ors) and Hennelly v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) (hereafter 
Hennelly)). 
17  Sections 162(11)(a) and (b) of the Act. 
18  See Msimang para 29; Gihwala para 144 and Lewis Group para 40 on the purposes 
of delinquency orders. 
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and to call the attention of the court to any relevant matters.19 Likewise, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (hereafter ASIC), 
Australia's national corporate regulatory authority, may intervene in 
proceedings under section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act for 
leave to manage a corporation.20 A very wide range of persons has been 
given locus standi to apply to court to declare a director delinquent or to 
place him or her under probation. These persons are a company, a 
shareholder, a director, a company secretary, a prescribed officer of a 
company, a registered trade union that represents employees of the 
company or another employee representative, the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an 
organ of state responsible for the administration of any legislation.21 
Nevertheless, such persons have no locus standi to intervene in the 
application to suspend or set aside these orders. This has the effect of 
attenuating the power conferred on such persons since a court may 
suspend or set aside the order that they had successfully obtained without 
any input from them. 
2.2  Imposing conditions on a suspended delinquency order 
In suspending a delinquency order and substituting it with a probation order 
under section 162(11)(a) of the Act, a court has a discretion whether or not 
to impose any conditions on the order. The determination of the conditions, 
typical conditions that may be imposed, and the breach thereof are 
discussed below. 
2.2.1  Determination of conditions 
It is unclear from section 162(11) of the Act whether the applicant is required 
to propose appropriate conditions to the court that would be imposed if his 
or her application under section 162(12) succeeds, or whether the court 
itself determines what the conditions should be.22 With regard to 
applications under section 17 of the CDDA, in many instances the 
applicants themselves propose to the court appropriate conditions that a 
                                            
19  This may be done by the Secretary of State giving evidence himself or herself or 
calling witnesses to do so. For an example of a case where the Secretary of State 
intervened in an application under s 17 of the CDDA, see Collins & Ors. 
20  Section 1330 of the Australian Corporations Act. 
21  Sections 162(2), (3) and (4) of the Act. 
22  Du Plessis and Delport 2017 SALJ 283. 
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court should consider imposing in order to protect the public.23 Bristoll 
remarks that most applicants offer fairly standard conditions drawn from the 
Secretary of State's guidelines, which are tailored to the facts of their 
particular case.24 In other instances the courts set the conditions 
themselves.25 Often the conditions of leave to act as a director are a 
combination of those proposed by the applicant and those imposed by the 
court.26 For example, in Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills27 the applicant proposed certain conditions for the court to 
consider imposing if his application for leave to act as a director was 
successful. The court granted the application in respect of one company on 
the basis of the conditions suggested by the applicant, but imposed its own 
additional conditions with regard to his appointment as a director of a 
second company in order to minimise the risk of harm to the public.28 A 
similar approach is adopted by the courts under section 206G of the 
Australian Corporations Act.29  
While the decision whether to impose conditions as well as the type of 
conditions to impose is in the discretion of the court, it is submitted that, in 
accordance with the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, it would be 
advisable for the applicant to propose appropriate conditions that a court 
may consider imposing, should his or her application be successful. This 
would not only guide the court on the conditions to be imposed but might 
also serve to persuade a court to suspend a delinquency order if the 
applicant were able to demonstrate that the conditions proposed by him or 
her would protect the public from a recurrence of his or her misconduct. 
2.2.2  Typical conditions 
It is useful to examine the type of conditions imposed by courts in the UK 
and Australia when granting leave to disqualified directors to act as 
                                            
23  See Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane [1998] 
1 BCLC 259 268 (hereafter Vane) for a further discussion of the approach to 
determining the conditions under s 17 of the CDDA. 
24  Bristoll 2014 Insolvency Intelligence 52. The guidelines issued by the Secretary of 
State include a list of the information which should generally be included in an 
application for leave to act as a director, although the evidence must be tailored to 
the facts of the particular case. For a discussion of the Secretary of State's guidelines 
see Bristoll 2014 Insolvency Intelligence 53.  
25  Belcher 2012 Edin LR 404. 
26  Belcher 2012 Edin LR 404.  
27  Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 283 
(hereafter Harris). 
28  Harris 295. 
29  See for example Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
[1998] TASSC 101 (hereafter Hosken). 
R CASSIM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
directors. This might provide guidance to South African courts on the 
appropriate conditions to impose in the event of a delinquency order being 
suspended under section 162(11) of the Act. 
Some of the conditions generally imposed by UK courts are conditions 
appointing a third party to supervise a director; conditions limiting the roles 
which the director may undertake; conditions regarding the composition of 
the board of directors in the particular company; and conditions relating to 
accounting controls.30 Examples of such conditions include: 
 that an independent chartered accountant or solicitor approved by the 
court acts as a co-director;31  
 that a director's loan owed by the company to the applicant not be 
repaid unless all the creditors of the company are first paid;32  
 that the applicant not be granted any security over the company's 
assets;33  
 that cheques be countersigned;34  
 that directors would receive only a board-approved salary;35  
 that the total emoluments that may be paid by the company to the 
director be restricted;36  
 that a company gives an undertaking that it would convene monthly 
board meetings and that these would be attended by a representative 
of the company's auditors.37  
                                            
30  See Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 17-18 (hereafter Gibson); Vane 268; Re 
Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd [2000] 2 BCC 204 213 (hereafter Dawes); 
Hicks 2001 JBL 447; Belcher 2012 Edin LR 404 and Bristoll 2014 Insolvency 
Intelligence 52. 
31  Re Majestic Recording Studios Ltd [1989] BCLC 1 7; Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Palfreman [1995] BCC 193 196; Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official 
Receiver v Sheridan [1996] 1 BCLC 327 337 (hereafter Brian Sheridan); Hennelly 
para 67. 
32  Gibson 17. 
33  Gibson 17; Harris 292. 
34  Gibson 17; Vane 272. 
35  Harris 292. 
36  Gibson 17; Harris 292. 
37  Re Chartmore Ltd [1990] BCLC 673 676; Vane 272; Hennelly para 67. 
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Some of the conditions imposed by Australian courts are conditions relating 
to the financial authority of the applicant,38 and appointing an independent 
person to supervise the company's business while the applicant was 
involved in management.39 In Re Minimix Industries Ltd40 the court imposed 
a condition restricting the applicant from signing any cheques drawn on the 
company's bank account for the remainder of his disqualification period.41 
In Re Jarret42 the court imposed a condition that a registered auditor be 
appointed as the auditor of the company, and also that the company lodge 
audited accounts with ASIC while the applicant is acting as a director of the 
company.  
It is submitted that the type of conditions imposed on a suspension of a 
delinquency order under section 162(11) of the Act should be determined 
by the nature of the particular case. It is suggested that the guiding principle 
should be that courts must impose conditions that are both enforceable and 
realistic.43 The conditions imposed by courts in the UK and Australia are 
tailored specifically to protect the public from the nature of the misconduct 
committed by the director, and to ensure that the public would be protected 
if leave to act as a director again is granted. It is submitted that a similar 
approach should be adopted by South African courts. The conditions 
imposed should relate to the original misconduct which had resulted in the 
delinquency order being granted, and should furthermore ensure that the 
public would be protected from a recurrence of such misconduct. For 
instance, if a director was declared delinquent because he or she had 
signed documents on behalf of the company despite knowing that he or she 
lacked the authority to do so,44 a condition that a court could appropriately 
impose would be that the director may not sign any documents on behalf of 
the company, including cheques drawn on the company's bank account. 
This would ensure that during the suspension of the delinquency order the 
risk of the director’s committing the same offence again would be minimised. 
                                            
38  Hosken para 15. In this case the Supreme Court of Tasmania imposed conditions 
restricting the amount of money that could be spent by the company without the prior 
consent of the accountant who was appointed to supervise the business of the 
company. 
39  Hosken para 15.  
40  Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 513 (hereafter Minimix). 
41  See further Re Chapman [2006] NSWSC 99 paras 18, 19 (hereafter Chapman). 
42  Re Jarret [1999] FCA 503 para 9 (hereafter Jarret). See further Re Hamilton-Irvine 
(1990) 8 ACLC 1067 1075. 
43  See Hennelly para 70. 
44  This is a ground of delinquency in terms of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) of the Act read with  
s 77(3)(a) of the Act. 
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2.2.3  Breach of conditions  
Under the CDDA if a person contravenes a disqualification order and by 
implication contravenes the conditions of a disqualification order, he or she 
commits both a criminal and a civil offence. Under section 13 of the CDDA, 
if a person acts in contravention of a disqualification order he or she is liable 
on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for not more than two years or 
a fine, or both, and on summary conviction to imprisonment for more than 
six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. 
Accordingly, the sanction for a breach of a condition is severe in that the 
person would be acting in breach of a disqualification order and would 
commit a criminal offence.45 In addition, a breach of a disqualification order 
in the UK exposes the director to potential personal liability.46 Sections 15(1) 
and 15(2) of the CDDA state that a disqualified person involved in the 
management of a company in contravention of a disqualification order is 
personally liable, jointly and severally with the company, for the debts of the 
company incurred during the term of the disqualification.  
In sharp contrast, the Act is silent on the consequences of a director failing 
to comply with the conditions imposed on him or her while the delinquency 
order is suspended. It is submitted that the word "suspended" in section 
162(11) of the Act implies that the "suspension" of the delinquency order 
may be revoked, and that the original delinquency order may be reinstated. 
On this basis, it is arguable that if a director were to breach any of the 
conditions imposed on him or her in terms of section 162(11) of the Act, the 
original delinquency order could be reinstated in full. The director would thus 
have to serve out the full term of the original delinquency order. If a director 
breaches the conditions imposed on him or her while under a probation 
order, he or she must, in terms of section 162(5)(b) of the Act, be declared 
a delinquent director.47  
The delinquency remedy under the Act is a civil remedy.48 It follows that the 
breach of a delinquency order or of a suspended delinquency order would 
                                            
45  Brian Sheridan 346; Collins & Ors 1018; Griffin 2002 NILQ 220. 
46  Brian Sheridan 346; Davies and Worthington Gower: Principles of Modern Company 
Law 239. 
47  Section 162(5)(b) of the Act states that a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if, while under a probation order, the person acted as a 
director in a manner that contravened the probation order. If a director were to breach 
the conditions imposed to a probation order, this would arguably constitute a breach 
of the probation order itself.  
48  Grancy para 155. 
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not be a criminal offence.49 Nevertheless, if a delinquency order is 
suspended by a court and the conditions attached to it are thereafter 
breached by a director, it is submitted that the director ought to be severely 
sanctioned by a court. The suspension of a delinquency order is an 
indulgence granted by a court to a delinquent director. Any conditions 
attached to the suspension of a delinquency order must be scrupulously 
observed and fully respected and complied with by a director. As the 
Chancery Division in Brian Sheridan50 emphasised, it is of "cardinal 
importance" that any conditions imposed by a court on a disqualified director 
are strictly observed. It is not clear from the Act whether a court would be 
empowered to extend the delinquency period to a term longer than the 
original period of delinquency, in the event of a director’s breaching the 
conditions of a suspended delinquency order. It is suggested that a court 
should be empowered to do so in appropriate circumstances, but this must 
be clarified by the legislature by amending the Act. 
2.3  Discretion of the court to suspend or set aside the delinquency 
or probation order 
A court has a discretion whether or not to grant the application to suspend 
the delinquency order or to set aside the probation order. This is made clear 
by section 162(12) of the Act, which states that in considering an application 
in section 162(11) "the court may" grant the order if "the court is satisfied" 
that the requirements in section 162(12)(b) are met.  
Neither the CDDA nor the Australian Corporations Act provides explicit 
statutory guidance to the courts on the manner in which they should 
exercise their discretion to grant leave to a disqualified director to act as a 
director. Accordingly in these jurisdictions the courts' "discretion [is] 
unfettered by any statutory condition or criterion."51 The courts in these 
jurisdictions have accordingly developed criteria for determining whether to 
grant such leave, and are guided by case law with regard to the overall 
approach to be adopted.52 In contrast, the Act has in section 162(12) 
usefully provided statutory criteria to be considered by the courts in 
exercising their discretion under section 162(11) applications. These criteria 
                                            
49  If, however, the delinquent director intentionally breaches a delinquency order this 
may in certain circumstances amount to contempt of court. 
50  Brian Sheridan 346. 
51  Dawes 211. 
52  Belcher 2012 Edin LR 387, 400. 
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are as follows:  
(12) On considering an application contemplated in subsection (11), the 
court may- 
(a) not grant the order applied for unless the applicant has 
satisfied any conditions that were attached to the original 
order, or imposed in terms of subsection 11 (a); and  
(b) grant an order if, having regard to the circumstances 
leading to the original order, and the conduct of the 
applicant in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that –  
(i) the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory 
progress towards rehabilitation; and 
(ii) there is a reasonable prospect that the 
applicant would be able to serve successfully 
as a director of a company in the future. 
The word "and" in section 162(12)(b)(i) makes it clear that the provisions 
are conjunctive and that the requirements of both sections 162(12)(b)(i) and 
162(12)(b)(ii) must be satisfied before a court may consider suspending or 
setting aside a delinquency order or probation order. The applicant bears 
the onus of persuading a court that the requirements in section 162(12)(b) 
of the Act have been fulfilled.  
In exercising their discretion under section 17 of the CDDA, courts in the UK 
balance the need for a director to act as such against the protection of the 
public from the conduct that had led to the disqualification order.53 While 
both the need of the disqualified person to earn a living and the need of the 
company to have the work done for the purposes of its business are 
considered, the latter need is more influential.54 In Collins & Ors55 the UK 
Court of Appeal remarked that the argument for leave to act as a director is 
more cogent in instances where the company needs to have the job done 
by the particular applicant. The approach of courts in the UK is that the 
starting point to bear in mind is that the purpose of a disqualification order 
is protective, and further, that leave must not be granted too freely.56 
Concerns have been raised by the UK Courts of Appeal that in some 
                                            
53  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Barnett [1998] 2 BCLC 64 68-70; Dawes 
210; Collins & Ors 1003; Re Britannia Homes Centres Ltd, Official Receiver v 
McCahill [2001] 2 BCLC 63 71-74; Hennelly para 63; Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Swan (No 2) [2005] EWHC 2479 para 10; Harris 297; Belcher 2012 
Edin LR 402. 
54  Collins & Ors 1003. 
55  Collins & Ors 1003. 
56  Vane 267. 
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instances leave is granted too easily by the courts of first instance. For 
example, in both Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v Griffiths57 and Collins & Ors58 the UK Court of Appeal 
expressed the view that the directors concerned had been "fortunate" that 
the court of first instance had granted leave to them to manage corporations. 
In exercising its discretion under section 206G of the Australian 
Corporations Act in deciding whether to grant leave to an applicant to 
manage a corporation, the Australian courts generally take into account 
several factors: (a) the nature of the offence; (b) the nature of the applicant's 
involvement in the offence; (c) the applicant's general character; (d) the 
structure of the companies in which the applicant may be a director; and (e) 
the risk posed to persons connected with the company and the public.59 This 
is not a closed list of factors.60 The importance of protecting the public is 
emphasised on the ground that those who have dealings with the company 
are entitled to find that they are dealing with persons of integrity and that the 
funds of the company are not dissipated by dishonest activities.61 Hardship 
is not generally a compelling factor taken into account by Australian courts 
for the reason that any hardship to the applicant was "self-created".62 As is 
the position in the UK, Australian courts have cautioned that the leave of the 
court to act as a director is not to be granted lightly.63 
It is submitted that in exercising their discretion under section 162(12) of the 
Act, South African courts should, as the UK and Australian courts do, bear 
in mind that section 162 is a remedy to protect the public interest.64 Courts 
                                            
57  Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Griffiths [1998] 2 All ER 124 131. 
58  Collins & Ors 1012.  
59  Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 28353 28354 (hereafter Magna 
Alloys); Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd (1977) ACLC 29556 29557-29559 (decided 
under s 122 of the Companies Act, 1961 (Victoria), the equivalent provision to  
s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act) (hereafter Zim Metal Products); Murray v 
Australian Securities Commission (1994) 12 ACLC 11 13, 14 (hereafter Murray); 
Jarret para 7; Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 
557 para 8 (hereafter Adams); Chapman paras 7-10. For a further discussion of 
these factors see Cassidy 1995 C&SLJ 228-234. 
60  Adams para 8; Chapman para 9.  
61  Minimix 512; Magna Alloys 28354; Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 28249 28255 
(hereafter Van Reesema); Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies 
[1991] TASSC 11 paras 4, 5 (hereafter Hazell Holdings); Jarret para 7; Chapman 
paras 7-11. 
62  Van Reesema 28255. See further Murray 14; Adams para 8; Chapman para 9 and 
Cassidy 1995 C&SLJ 232, 233. 
63  See Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1980] ACLC 34334 34340 
(hereafter Zuker). 
64  See further Msimang para 29; Gihwala para 144 and Lewis Group para 40. 
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must thus exercise caution in considering applications under section 
162(11). The protection of the public would include all the relevant interest 
groups and stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, investors, 
customers, creditors and all those with whom the company will do 
business.65 While the protection of the public is not explicitly specified in 
section 162(12) as one of the factors to be taken into account by a court in 
a section 162(11) application, it is submitted that the purpose of a court in 
considering the other factors listed in section 162(12) (discussed in 
paragraph 3 below) – whether the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory 
progress towards rehabilitation and there is a reasonable prospect that he 
or she would be able successfully to serve as a director in the future – is to 
ensure that the applicant would not pose a risk to the public if the application 
were granted. It follows that a court would implicitly take into account the 
protection of the public in exercising its discretion under section 162(12) of 
the Act, even if this factor is not explicitly specified in the provision. It is 
further submitted that in accordance with the approach adopted in the UK 
and Australia, the hardship on the applicant should not weigh too heavily as 
a factor to be considered by a court in exercising its discretion under section 
162(12) of the Act.  
3 Factors to be taken into account by a court in 
exercising its discretion under section 162(12) of the 
Act 
The factors that a court must take into account in exercising its discretion 
whether or not to suspend or set aside an order of delinquency or probation 
are set out in section 162(12) of the Act. Each of these factors is examined 
below. 
3.1  Compliance with conditions 
Section 162(12)(a) of the Act prohibits a court from granting the order under 
section 162(11) of the Act unless the applicant has satisfied any conditions 
that were attached to the original order, or which are imposed on him or her 
when the court suspended the delinquency order and substituted it with a 
probation order. If an applicant has not satisfied such conditions, the 
application must not be granted. A court does not have any discretion in this 
regard. It is submitted that section 162(12)(a) highlights the importance of 
the conditions imposed by a court on a delinquency order and a probation 
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order. In similar vein, in Brian Sheridan66 the Chancery Division found that 
the approach of courts in the UK is not to tolerate imperfect compliance with 
the conditions attached to a disqualification order.  
The applicant bears the onus of proving that he or she has complied with all 
the conditions that were attached to the delinquency order or the probation 
order. For instance, if a court had imposed as a condition to the delinquency 
order that the director must undertake a designated programme of remedial 
education or carry out a designated programme of community service,67 the 
applicant must prove to the court that he or she has complied with these 
conditions. It is advisable for delinquent directors or those under probation 
orders to ensure that they retain evidence of their compliance with the 
conditions imposed by a court so as to facilitate any application under 
section 162(11) of the Act at a later stage.  
The UK Court of Appeal in Collins & Ors68 cautioned against courts 
imposing conditions that are of such a nature that they are too easily 
disregarded and almost impossible to police. The court's concern was that 
a breach of a condition might well not come to light unless and until the 
company or another company managed by the disqualified director "has 
come to grief",69 by which stage it would be too late to secure the intended 
protection for the public.  
Since compliance with relevant conditions is fundamentally important in 
order to protect the public, it is submitted that it would be advisable for South 
African courts to appoint someone to monitor whether the applicant does in 
fact comply with such conditions. For example, in Hennelly70 the Chancery 
Division appointed the finance director of the company to provide quarterly 
reports to the Department of Trade and Industry on the level of compliance 
by the disqualified director with the conditions imposed by the court. 
Appointing such a person would also facilitate an application under section 
162(11) of the Act, since the appointed person would be in a position to 
report to the court on the extent of the applicant's compliance with the court-
imposed conditions.  
An alternative suggestion to monitor the director's compliance with the 
                                            
66  Brian Sheridan 342. 
67  These conditions are listed in s 162(10) of the Act as possible conditions which a 
court may impose to a delinquency or probation order.  
68  Collins & Ors 1018. 
69  Collins & Ors 1019. 
70  Hennelly para 68.  
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conditions imposed by a court, and which should be applied in South African 
law, would be to require such a director to lodge an affidavit with the court 
after a specified period of time confirming that he or she has complied with 
the relevant conditions. For example, in Brian Sheridan71 the Chancery 
Division imposed a condition to the effect that within 21 days of the date of 
the court order the director concerned had to lodge an affidavit with the court 
confirming that all the conditions laid down by the court had been satisfied. 
Such a condition, the Chancery Division remarked, would serve to 
concentrate the mind of the director on the necessity to comply strictly with 
the terms of the court order.72 
A further suggestion to monitor the director's compliance with any conditions 
would be to serve a copy of the court order, together with the conditions, on 
all the parties who would be affected by any failure of the director to comply 
with such conditions. Such parties could be the shareholders and creditors 
of the company and, if applicable, the company's bank and the South 
African Revenue Service. It is submitted that if the fact that a delinquent 
director were functioning as such under the terms of a suspended 
delinquency order were to be publicised to the relevant parties, this would 
limit the risk of the director failing to fully comply with the conditions imposed 
on him or her. 
3.2  The circumstances leading to the original order  
This factor requires a court to consider the reason why the director was 
initially declared delinquent or placed under probation. In a similar vein, the 
seriousness of the conduct which led to the original disqualification order is 
also taken into account by courts in the UK73 and Australia.74 Some of the 
factors that UK courts consider to "loom very large"75 are if the director's 
conduct involved any dishonesty; if the company had been allowed to 
continue trading while it had been insolvent, and if a director had been 
withdrawing excessive amounts of remuneration in anticipation of the 
company's collapse and in effect living off the company's creditors.76 Where 
the circumstances leading to the original order related to dishonesty on the 
                                            
71  Brian Sheridan 343.  
72  Brian Sheridan 346.  
73  See Vane 268; Re Barings plc (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
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part of the director, courts in both the UK77 and Australia78 are reluctant to 
grant leave to disqualified directors to act as such. In Magna Alloys the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales remarked that in a case which involves 
dishonesty in the handling of money a court would be particularly reluctant 
to grant leave to an applicant to manage a corporation because it would not 
want to afford the person "an opportunity of renewing his depredations".79 
On the other hand, where the offence is not connected with the conduct of 
a company's affairs, Australian courts are more likely to grant leave to an 
applicant to manage a corporation.80 For example, in Hazell Holdings the 
applicant had been convicted of certain offences in terms of traffic legislation 
and was consequently disqualified from being a director. In granting the 
applicant's application for leave to act as a director of various companies, 
the court held that there was no risk that the applicant's reinstatement as a 
director would pose any danger to shareholders, employees, competitors, 
customers or anyone including Government departments with whom he or 
any of the companies was likely to have dealings.81 
In accordance with the approach adopted by the UK and Australian courts, 
it is submitted that, in considering the circumstances leading to the original 
delinquency or probation order, a court should take into account the gravity 
of the misconduct which led to the original order. A heavier burden of 
convincing the court to grant an application under section 162(11) of the Act 
should lie on an applicant who has committed a more serious offence which 
resulted in the original order, particularly an offence which involved 
dishonesty. For instance, if the applicant had intentionally inflicted harm 
upon the company, as opposed to doing so by gross negligence,82 this 
factor should weigh more heavily against him or her. It is further submitted 
that, in accordance with the approach adopted in Australia, a distinction 
should be drawn between offences connected to the conduct of a 
company's affairs and those unrelated to the affairs of the company. The 
                                            
77  See Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Barnett [1998] 2 BCLC 64 72; 
Goddard 2004 Company Lawyer 222 and Bristoll 2014 Insolvency Intelligence 51. 
78  See Magna Alloys 28354. 
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grounds of delinquency listed in sections 162(5)(b),83 (c)84 and (f)85 of the 
Act relate to offences committed by a director while he or she was a director 
of the company, and relate to the company's affairs. The grounds of 
delinquency referred to in sections 162(5)(d)86 and (e)87 of the Act do not 
necessarily relate to offences committed by a director in connection with the 
conduct of the company's affairs. If, for example, an applicant had been 
declared delinquent because he or she had twice been personally convicted 
of an offence in terms of legislation unrelated to his or her position as a 
director in a company, arguably this factor should be taken into account in 
favour of the applicant, in the application to suspend the delinquency order. 
3.3  The conduct of the applicant in the ensuing period 
This factor relates to the manner in which the applicant conducted himself 
or herself between the time that the delinquency order or probation order 
was granted and the time of the application in terms of section 162(11) of 
the Act. The Act provides no guidance on whether a court should take into 
account the applicant's conduct only in relation to his or her dealing with 
companies, or whether his or her conduct generally is to be taken into 
account. In the absence of any statutory guidance on this point, it is 
submitted that a court should take into account the conduct of the applicant 
in relation to his or her dealings with companies as well as the general 
conduct of the applicant which may demonstrate the progress of the 
rehabilitation and the applicant's prospects of being able to serve 
successfully in the future as a director of a company. 
UK courts similarly take into account a director's conduct in relation to his 
or her dealings with companies, in considering whether to grant leave to him 
                                            
83  This offence relates to acting as a director in a manner that contravenes a probation 
order. 
84  These offences relate to a director grossly abusing his or her position; taking 
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or her to manage corporations. In Vane88 the Chancery Division remarked 
that if a director had acted as such whilst the disqualification proceedings 
were pending, it would be relevant for the court to determine whether the 
companies had carried on business satisfactorily. Relevant factors to 
consider are whether the companies were trading profitably, whether they 
had complied with their obligations under the relevant company legislation, 
fiscal legislation and other applicable legislation, and whether the 
companies had paid their liabilities in full.89  
Australian courts likewise, in considering whether or not to grant leave to a 
disqualified director to act as a director, take into account the conduct of the 
applicant in the period from the time of the disqualification order to the time 
of the application for leave to act as a director.90 This factor has been 
particularly persuasive in cases where leave has been successfully granted 
to an applicant to act as a director.91 For example, in granting leave to the 
applicant to act as a director in Zuker92 the Supreme Court of Victoria 
attached much significance to the applicant's good behaviour since his 
disqualification to act as a director. The court regarded the applicant's good 
behaviour as "strong positive reasons"93 for exercising its discretion in the 
applicant's favour. 
In considering an application under section 162(11) of the Act it is submitted, 
following the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, that a court should 
consider whether the applicant has successfully acted as a director of other 
companies while the original delinquency or probation proceedings were 
pending, and thereafter. The court should assess whether the companies 
were trading profitably, whether they had complied with their obligations 
under the relevant company legislation, income tax and other applicable 
legislation, whether the companies had paid their liabilities in full and 
whether there had been any complaints against the applicant during the 
period that he or she had been acting as a director of a company. Of course, 
if the delinquency order had prohibited the applicant from acting as a 
director of any company, these factors would not be relevant to the 
applicant's application under section 162(11) of the Act. In such an event, it 
is submitted that a court should take into account the applicant's general 
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R CASSIM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  20 
conduct in the ensuing period. For instance, any dishonest conduct by the 
applicant in the period after the delinquency order or probation order was 
made would be a relevant factor for a court to take into account. If the 
applicant had tried to mislead the court in his or her application in terms of 
section 162(11), this ought to weigh heavily against him or her. For example, 
in Van Reesema94 one of the grounds on which the Supreme Court of South 
Australia refused to grant leave to a disqualified director to manage a 
corporation was that his affidavit in court had been misleading and "less 
than frank".95 
3.4  Rehabilitation of the director  
This factor requires a court to determine whether, based on the 
circumstances leading to the original order and the conduct of the applicant 
in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that the applicant has 
demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation. The Act does not 
define the term "rehabilitation" in the context of section 162(12)(b)(i), nor 
does it provide any guidance on the factors a court should take into account 
to assess whether the applicant has made satisfactory progress towards 
rehabilitation. Consequently, courts would have to develop criteria for 
determining whether the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress 
towards rehabilitation. Under section 162(12)(b)(i) the applicant need not 
have been fully rehabilitated for a court to suspend a delinquency order or 
set aside a probation order – he or she merely needs to demonstrate 
"satisfactory progress" towards rehabilitation. 
The term "rehabilitation" is akin to the term "reformation",96 which term was 
found by the High Court of Australia in Rich v Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission97 to resemble sentencing principles under 
criminal law.98 In criminal law the concept of being rehabilitated means that 
the offender has learnt new values, has reformed and is now fit to take his 
or her place in society.99 The term "rehabilitation" or "reformation" connotes 
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positive impressions of the betterment of individuals.100 The notion of 
whether an offender is rehabilitated or has reformed focuses attention on 
the offender as an individual, as opposed to the offence itself or the harm 
caused by the offence.101 In the penal context the rehabilitation of a criminal 
is achieved either while the offender is incarcerated in prison, through 
rehabilitation programmes, or through making the completion of some 
rehabilitation programme a condition of the suspension of a punishment of 
imprisonment.102 The notion of rehabilitation is thus based on the premise 
that the delinquent may be re-educated to become a useful member of 
society.103 
In an application under section 162(11) of the Act a delinquent director 
would have to present evidence to the court over a period of at least three 
years demonstrating that he or she has made satisfactory progress towards 
rehabilitation. In Grancy104 the court remarked that an applicant would most 
probably not be able to demonstrate satisfactory progress towards 
rehabilitation in a period shorter than three years. The applicant could, for 
example, present evidence showing that he or she has complied 
satisfactorily with all of the conditions imposed by the court in terms of the 
delinquency order. While compliance with the conditions imposed by a court 
is one of the factors that a court would take into account in deciding whether 
to grant the application to suspend or set aside the order of delinquency or 
probation, compliance with the conditions imposed by a court may also 
serve to demonstrate that an applicant has made satisfactory progress 
towards rehabilitation. For instance, compliance by an applicant with a 
condition that he or she undertake a designated programme of remedial 
education relevant to his or her conduct as a director, or that he or she carry 
out a designated programme of community service105 might indicate to a 
court that the applicant has made progress towards rehabilitation, and that 
there is a reduced need for public protection from the applicant. It is 
submitted that courts ought to make more effective use of their power to 
impose appropriate ancillary conditions to declarations of delinquency so as 
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to facilitate the rehabilitation of delinquent directors.106 
If an applicant is permitted to be a director of another company while under 
a delinquency order or a probation order he or she would be able to present 
evidence to the court of his or her conduct that demonstrates progress 
towards rehabilitation as a director in the other company during the 
delinquency order. Presenting evidence of rehabilitation would be more 
challenging in the case of an applicant who has been absolutely prohibited 
from being a director of any company during the delinquency period. In such 
an event, an applicant could present evidence to the court demonstrating 
that his or her conduct in the previous three years in a position other than a 
director indicates that he or she is on the path towards rehabilitation. For 
instance, if the applicant were appointed as a manager of a company (in the 
position of an employee, as opposed to a director) and has satisfactorily 
complied with all his or her duties without any complaint from any party, this 
would indicate satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation. Alternatively, if 
the applicant had successfully carried on a business as a sole trader with 
unlimited liability during the delinquency period, this might serve as 
evidence to a court that the applicant has made satisfactory progress 
towards rehabilitation. It would be important for an applicant who intends to 
apply to court for a suspension of his or her delinquency order or for his or 
her probation order to be set aside to take steps towards rehabilitation 
during the delinquency or probation period, and to present the court with 
sufficient evidence demonstrating satisfactory progress towards his or her 
rehabilitation. 
3.5  Reasonable prospect of serving successfully as a director in the 
future 
This factor requires the court to consider whether the applicant is likely to 
be a future risk to the public, as opposed to focusing on the applicant's past 
misconduct. The court has to determine whether, based on the 
circumstances leading to the original order and the conduct of the applicant 
in the ensuing period, it is satisfied that there is a "reasonable prospect" of 
the applicant being able to serve successfully as a director of a company in 
the future. It is not clear what a "reasonable prospect" would comprise since 
the Act does not define this term in the context of section 162(12)(b)(ii). Its 
meaning has been left to the courts to determine. 
The phrase "reasonable prospect" has been used in the Act in the context 
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of business rescue proceedings and jurisprudence on its meaning has 
developed. For this reason, until the jurisprudence develops on the meaning 
of this phrase in the context of section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Act, it is useful 
to refer to its meaning in the context of business rescue proceedings.107 
Courts have proclaimed that in the context of business rescue the concept 
of a "reasonable prospect" is a lesser requirement than a "reasonable 
probability" but more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable 
possibility.108 Emphasis has been placed on the fact that the prospect must 
be "reasonable", which it is said means that it must be a prospect based on 
reasonable grounds – a mere speculative suggestion would not suffice.109 
The existence of a reasonable prospect is a factual question, albeit involving 
a value judgment.110 In Prospec111 the court asserted that a "prospect" 
means an expectation, which may or may not come true, and therefore 
signifies a possibility. A possibility is reasonable if it rests on a ground that 
is objectively reasonable.112 Consequently, the court reasoned, a 
"reasonable prospect" means no more than a possibility that rests on 
objectively reasonable grounds.113 A cogent evidential foundation must be 
placed before the court to support the existence of a reasonable prospect 
that the desired object can be achieved.114  
To apply the interpretation of a "reasonable prospect" in the context of 
section 131(4)(a) of the Act to section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Act, in an 
application to suspend a delinquency order or to set aside a probation order, 
the applicant would have to satisfy a court that, based on objectively 
reasonable grounds, there is a possibility that he or she would be able to 
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serve successfully as a director of a company in the future. While vague 
averments and mere speculative suggestions would not suffice, an 
applicant need not go so far as to establish a reasonable probability that he 
or she would be able to serve successfully as a director of a company in the 
future. Based on the evidential foundation put before the court by the 
applicant, the court would have to make a value judgment whether the 
applicant would be able to serve successfully as a director in the future.  
In those instances where the delinquency order completely excludes the 
applicant from being a director of any company it would be more challenging 
for a director to be able to present to court evidence of a "reasonable 
prospect" of him or her being able to serve successfully as a director in the 
future.115 If the declaration of delinquency permits a director to serve as a 
director of another company, he or she would have to present evidence to 
the court of having successfully served on the board of directors of the other 
company or companies. He or she might, for instance, present to the court 
affidavits from his or her fellow board members attesting to his or her ability 
to successfully serve as a director of such companies. 
4  Conclusion 
This article has analysed the suspension and setting aside of delinquency 
and probation orders under section 162(11) of the Act. While courts have a 
discretion whether or not to grant an application, they are bound by the 
statutory guidelines set out in section 162(12) of the Act in exercising their 
discretion. Unlike the position in the UK and Australia, a third party may not 
intervene in the application. Some challenges that may be faced by an 
applicant under section 162(11) include demonstrating to a court that 
satisfactory progress has been made towards rehabilitation, and convincing 
a court that there is a reasonable prospect of the applicant’s being able to 
serve successfully as a director in the future. These challenges are 
augmented if a director was absolutely prohibited from being a director of 
any company for the duration of the order.  
It is recommended that, in exercising its discretion in terms of section 
162(11) of the Act, a court should, in accordance with the approach adopted 
in the UK and Australia, bear in mind that section 162 of the Act is intended 
to protect the public interest. Consequently, suspending or setting aside a 
delinquency order or a probation order must not frustrate the achievement 
of this object. In accordance with the approach adopted in Australia, the 
                                            
115  Du Plessis and Delport 2017 SALJ 284. 
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hardship on the applicant should not weigh too heavily as a factor to be 
considered by the court.  
It is suggested that the applicant should guide the court by proposing 
appropriate conditions which it might consider if the application succeeds. 
In order to minimise the risk of a recurrence of the misconduct complained 
of, it is submitted that the conditions imposed by a court must be specifically 
tailored to address the misconduct that was committed by the director, 
which resulted in the delinquency order being granted. It is submitted that 
courts should ensure that the conditions imposed on a suspended 
delinquency order are capable of being monitored and that they are not 
easily disregarded by a director. For example, the court could appoint a 
suitable person to monitor compliance with the conditions. A court could 
also require the applicant to lodge an affidavit with it confirming that he or 
she has complied with the conditions, or it could serve a copy of the court 
order and the conditions on relevant parties. It is suggested that if an 
applicant breaches any of the conditions imposed by the court during the 
suspended delinquency order, the original delinquency order should be 
reinstated in full. The legislation is unclear as to whether a court may extend 
the delinquency period if the conditions are breached by the applicant. It is 
submitted that a court should be empowered to do so in appropriate 
circumstances, but this should be clarified by the legislature by amending 
the Act. 
In considering the circumstances leading to the original delinquency or 
probation order in terms of section 162(12)(b) of the Act, in accordance with 
the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, a court should take into 
account the gravity of the misconduct which had led to the original order. A 
distinction should be drawn between offences that are connected with the 
conduct of the company's affairs and those that are unrelated to the 
company's affairs. 
Clarity is required on the meaning of the term "conduct" as used in section 
162(12)(b) of the Act. It is suggested that in considering the conduct of the 
applicant in the ensuing period, a court should take into account both the 
specific conduct of the applicant in relation to his or her dealing with 
companies as well as his or her general conduct which may demonstrate 
progress towards rehabilitation. The meaning of the term "rehabilitation" as 
used in section 162(12)(b)(i) of the Act should be clarified. It is suggested 
that guidance on the meaning of these terms may be sought in the criminal 
law context, where the term "rehabilitation" is used in sentencing 
proceedings. Certainty is furthermore required on the meaning of the phrase 
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"reasonable prospect" of serving successfully as a director in the future, as 
used in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Act. Drawing on the interpretation of this 
phrase in the context of business rescue proceedings, it is submitted that it 
means a possibility, and not a probability, based on objectively reasonable 
grounds that the director will be able to serve successfully as a director in 
the future.  
In the light of the gravity of a delinquency order and a probation order, 
granting leave to an applicant under section 162(11) of the Act to act as a 
director must be carefully considered by a court. This is particularly 
important in order to accord with the purpose of the Act in section 7(j), that 
is, to encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies. It 
is hoped that the above recommendations would offer some guidance to 
courts on interpreting and applying the remedy in section 162(11) of the Act 
and in exercising their discretion in such applications. 
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